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ABSTRACT 
 
Employment equity is a very crucial component in a country such as South Africa whose 
history is plagued with decades of unfair discrimination. Affirmative action measures attempt 
to provide equal opportunities to previously disadvantaged groups (designated groups) which 
did not have these opportunities afforded to them during the apartheid regime. During the 
milestone case of Barnard, the court established a principle which entailed that white people 
could be refused appointment if their race group was overrepresented in that workforce. This 
principle was later confirmed in a later Constitutional Court judgment as also being 
applicable to individuals from designated groups. Both the EEA and Barnard principle are 
aimed at achieving broadly representative workplaces but the latter has the potential of 
limiting the application of the former. Statistics from different bodies not only indicate that 
there are problems with the EEA but also show that white people are still predominantly 
occupying top management positions. This is problematic because individuals from 
designated groups are refused appointment due to adequate representation and this hinders 
their chances of being granted an equal opportunity. The determination of the legality of the 
principle is determined in this dissertation and whether this principle can continue to operate 
in our law having not been inserted into current legislation. Previous consideration of these 
research questions has failed to address this matter because on the face of it, both the Barnard 
principle and the EEA seem to be aiming to achieve the same goal. This dissertation analyses 
affirmative action measures as well as the implementation of the EEA whilst also considering 
the problems that could be associated with the continuous application of the Barnard 
principle. The results of the research demonstrate that although the Barnard principle has not 
been confirmed, it is likely that courts will continue to apply the principle and assign more 
weight to it then the measures provided in the EEA.  
  
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DECLARATION.................................................................................................................. ii 
ACKNOWLEGMENTS ..................................................................................................... iii 
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................... iv 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 7 
1.       BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................... 7 
2.       RATIONALE ............................................................................................................... 9 
3.       PURPOSE STATEMENT (AIMS AND OBJECTIVES) ........................................... 9 
4.       RESEARCH QUESTIONS ....................................................................................... 10 
5.       LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................................... 10 
6.       RESEARCH METHODOLOGY............................................................................... 12 
 
CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF DISCRIMINATION, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND 
THE BENEFICIARIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ..................................................... 14 
1.       INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 14 
2.       UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION .................................................................................. 15 
3.       AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ........................................................................................ 16 
4.       CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 22   
 
CHAPTER 3: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EEA .................................................. 23 
1.       INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 23 
2.       THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE EEA .................................................... 23 
3.       THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN TRANSFORMATIVE LAW ....................... 24 
4.       THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EEA ............................................................... 25 
5.       CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 31 
 
CHAPTER 4: REFUSAL OF APPOINTMENT DUE TO OVERREPRESENTATION OF A 
SPECIFIC RACE GROUP .................................................................................................. 32 
1.        SOLIDARITY OBO BARNARD................................................................................. 32 
             (a)       Facts ............................................................................................................ 32 
             (b)       Labour court ................................................................................................ 33 
             (c)       Labour appeal court (LAC) ......................................................................... 34 
vi 
 
             (d)       Supreme court of appeal ............................................................................. 37 
             (e)       Constitutional court ..................................................................................... 38 
2.        CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 43 
 
CHAPTER 5: SUGGESTIONS/ RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION ............ 45 
1.       INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 45 
2.       RECOMMENDATIONS/ SUGGESTIONS ............................................................. 45 
3.       CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 48 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................ 50  
      
7 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
 
1. BACKGROUND 
 
South Africa is a country that experienced a great deal of discrimination during the apartheid 
regime. This led to many race groups being deprived of their basic human rights. During the 
apartheid era, black, indian and coloured people were not granted the same opportunities as 
white people.1 After the country became a democracy in 1994 and the Constitution2 came 
into effect in 1996, along with other legislative changes, it became necessary to introduce 
legislation that would eradicate past discrimination and attempt to put every citizen on a 
platform that they would have been on had it not been for apartheid. The Employment Equity 
Act 55 of 1998 (EEA) attempts to achieve equity in the workplace by implementing measures 
such as affirmative action. The EEA categorises the beneficiaries of affirmative action.3 
These beneficiaries are black people, women and people with disabilities, and are categorised 
under ‘designated groups’4. The drafters of the EEA chose to give the term ‘black people’ a 
wide interpretation as it represents Africans, Indians, Coloureds and Asians.5 Although the 
disadvantage that was suffered by women and disabled persons was not considered to be of 
the level of black people, they were prejudiced in that many opportunities were not open to 
them.6 Affirmative action measures in South Africa are primarily aimed at offering 
opportunities and advancing the designated groups in their employment.7 
 
Affirmative action is not defined under the EEA but is considered a form of fair 
discrimination.8 It gives effect to substantive equality. It is a measure that attempts to rectify 
the wrongs of the discrimination previously experienced in the past.9 The purpose of the EEA 
                                                          
1 S Ebrahim ‘Equal pay for work of equal value in terms of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998: Lessons 
from the International Labour Organisation and the United Kingdom’ (2016) 19 PER 3. 
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
3 M McGregor ‘Categorisation to determine beneficiaries of affirmative action: Advantages and deficiencies’ 
(2005) 46 Codicillus 1, 2. 
4 Section 1 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 
5 Ibid. 
6 J Grogan ‘Demographic equity: Turning workers into cyphers’ (2017) 33 Employment Law 3. 
7 McGregor op cit note 3 at 2. 
8 Ibid. 
9 J Grogan ‘The Chronicles of Barnard: Affirmative action on trial’ (2014) 30 (6) Employment Law 2. 
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is to have broadly representative workforces in South Africa.10 The EEA attempts to strike an 
equilibrium by eliminating the effects of discrimination and also trying to create more 
opportunities for individuals by providing for a diverse workforce in one piece of 
legislation.11 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard12 established a new 
principle. The Barnard principle denoted that  
 
‘an employer could refuse promotion to a white woman because persons of her demographic category 
were already overrepresented at the occupational level in question’.13  
 
This principle is broadly applied to also include black people. The court in Barnard 
concluded that in order for a workplace to be representative, there should be an equal 
representation of all the demographics of people in South Africa within that workforce. On 
one hand, drafters of the EEA have enacted it to give people more opportunities in the 
workplace and increase their chances of being promoted. On the other hand, the Barnard 
principle states that the employment or promotion of a person can be denied if their race 
group is already ‘overrepresented’. In the court’s defence, the aim of the principle is to allow 
for other race groups to be employed and the realisation of a ‘broadly representative 
workforce’. At face value, the principle appears to be in line with the EEA but the fact that it 
also applies to black people could be problematic.14 This raises the question of whether the 
principle is not hindering on the measures put in place by the EEA. Affirmative action seeks 
to create opportunities for black people, it does not seek to prejudice them. Furthermore, the 
application of the principle is uncertain in an area that contains a large demographic of a 
specific race group.15 Consideration must be given to whether the application of the EEA and 
the principle can coherently operate at the same time. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Section 2 of the EEA. 
11 Ibid. 
12 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 (6) SA 123 (CC) see also Solidarity obo Barnard 
v South African Police Service 2014 (2) SA 1 (SCA). 
13 D du Toit ‘Much ado about – what exactly?’ IR Network 26 July 2016 at 3. 
14 Grogan op cit note 6 at 4. 
15 S Harrison & PM Pillay ‘Employment equity demographics- going national or staying regional?’ The 
Mercury 31 January 2014 at 2. 
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2. RATIONALE 
 
This dissertation is motivated by the need to have clarity and certainty on this particular 
system of law. The justification for this research question is such that this area of the law will 
be worth researching as it has not been considered in the spectrum of employment equity. 
Many people are under the presumption that the EEA stipulates that black people, women 
and people with disabilities must be given preference when it comes to an appointment in the 
workplace, but this is not the case.16 The decision in Barnard has brought about change to the 
ideologies and implementation of the EEA.17 Although black candidates still get first 
preference due to past discrimination, they can also be constitutionally refused employment 
based on an overrepresentation of their race group at that work level.18 This study will look at 
the fairness and legality of the exclusion of overrepresented groups from appointment and 
improve social awareness on the issue. The field has not been considered, approaching the 
dissertation from this angle will reveal some interesting points. 
 
3. PURPOSE STATEMENT (AIMS AND OBJECTIVES) 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to assess the impact of affirmative action measures on the 
ability of employers to make an informed decision. This means that the dissertation ascertains 
whether the implementation of the EEA largely influences an employer’s decision of 
appointment. By the final chapter of this dissertation, the thesis seeks to have fully 
expounded upon the Barnard principle and how it might hinder an individual’s potential of 
being appointed regardless of whether they are suitably qualified for the position. One of the 
most crucial objectives of this dissertation is to provide a critical analysis of the EEA and 
affirmative action and different arguments that have been raised about the two. As previously 
stated, the EEA and the Barnard principle aim to achieve the same outcome but this 
dissertation highlights the problems that could arise in applying both simultaneously. Finally, 
possible solutions will be provided on some of the problems that are raised throughout this 
dissertation. 
 
                                                          
16 J Grogan Workplace Law 11ed (2014) 86. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Solidarity & others v Department of Correctional Services & others (Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union & 
another as amici curiae) para 40; see also J Van Wyk ‘The importance of regional demographics’ The Times 24 
January 2014 at 3. 
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4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
In pursuit of the main focus of this dissertation, these are the following research questions: 
 
1. To what extent has the implementation of the EEA and affirmative action measures 
influenced the way in which employers address issues of discrimination, employment 
and promotions in the workplace? 
2. How has affirmative action, specifically demographic goal targets, influenced the way 
in which employers select their prospective employees? 
3. Does the Barnard principle create uncertainty in this field of law? If so, to what extent 
could this uncertainty create confusion to both employers and judges who have to 
decide matters that are brought before the court? 
4. What effect will the Barnard principle, if applied consistently, have on workforces 
and their employment equity policies? 
5. If both the EEA and the Barnard principle are applied, how will the results be 
consistent with the purpose and aim of the EEA? 
 
5. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A focus on the refusal of employment due to an overrepresentation of a race group indicates 
that there is no literature on the area other than general case notes on the Barnard case. Apon 
and Smit19 suggest that the question of whether the failure to implement affirmative action 
measures amount to discrimination depends on whether affirmative action could be said to be 
an individual or collective right. Grogan20 seemingly represents a counter-argument by 
stating that the Act permits but does not require employers to engage in affirmative action 
programmes but further continues to add that an obligation is expressly imposed in terms of 
Chapter III of the Act.21 Furthermore, designated employees include black people and women 
of all race groups meaning that members of one designated group cannot complain if a 
member from the other designated group is favoured. Apon and Smith submit that when two 
candidates, one designated and the other non-designated, are considered, it is prima facie that 
                                                          
19 L Apon & N Smit ‘Does a right to be appointed exist for designated groups? The “boundaries of employment 
equity” revisited’ 2010 (2) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 353. 
20 Grogan op cit note 16 at 87. 
21 Ibid at 97. 
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no preference is given to either one.22 However, this view fails to take into account the fact 
that an omission to differentiate may be a discriminatory act, employers must differentiate for 
the purposes of affirmative action in the workplace.23 
 
Discrimination is not narrowly limited to the listed grounds of the EEA as it may 
include a failure to prefer a designated employee over a non-designated employee even in the 
absence of a collective agreement.24 This argument is challenged by an article discussing case 
authority which made a bold statement to the effect that in order to diversify the workplace, a 
designated employer is entitled to deny black people appointment on the basis that they are 
already adequately represented in that occupational level. Attempting to obtain a goal of a 
broadly representative workplace makes it difficult for employees from previously 
advantaged groups to claim that they were unfairly overlooked for appointment to positions if 
the employer preferred a candidate from a previously disadvantaged group.25 
 
McGregor identified deficiencies in the categorisation used by the Act.26 First, she 
contends that the categories are over-inclusive in that they are based on the assumption that 
all persons from the designated groups are disadvantaged.27 People that have not been 
disadvantaged are still able to benefit in terms of affirmative action. Furthermore, there 
should be a provision that provides for degrees of disadvantage because the people that were 
mostly disadvantaged are not recognised. Secondly, McGregor submits that the subgroups 
within the designated groups makes it possible for middle-class white women to benefit from 
affirmative action based on the fact that they fall under the category of women.28 It is 
evidently clear that the notion of excluding overrepresented groups from appointment confers 
authority on employers to overlook designated employees and also determine 
overrepresentation in relation to the racial composition of the broader population.29 It is 
crucial to consider literature that will ascertain the current legal position on equality in the 
workplace. Such literature is critical in making a determination on the extent of the 
implementation of the EEA. Fergus and Collier outline the role that the judiciary plays in the 
                                                          
22 Apon & Smit op cit note 19 at 353. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid at 367. 
25 Grogan op cit note 16 at 97. 
26 McGregor op cit note 3 at 6. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid at 7. 
29 Grogan op cit note 6 at 9. 
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promotion of transformation in the workplace.30 They correctly identify how the judiciary 
interpret and apply the law as prescribed by the EEA.31 It can be argued that the judiciary is 
at times incorrect in the conclusions that they reach. These decisions are lenient and do not 
set examples for employers to comply.32 The purpose of this paper is to ascertain what the 
courts have said when cases concerning employment equity laws have come before them.33 
The duos paper also includes an analysis of the most important provisions in the EEA.34 
 
Mushariwa critically engages with affirmative action measures.35 The beneficiaries of 
affirmative action are accurately outlined as well as what is considered a strong and weak 
affirmative action plan.36 The thesis captures the challenges associated with the beneficiaries 
of affirmative action; there is no distinction made on the degrees of discrimination that they 
have experienced and that even people who did not experience discrimination are able to 
benefit from affirmative action.37 Dupper questions the validity of the EEA.38 The focus of 
the thesis is to interrogate the entirety of affirmative action. According to the author, the 
measure is uncertain in who it is for, how it is applied and when it will be finalised.39 This 
dissertation will consider the arguments represented in the above-mentioned literature and 
present the findings on the arguments put forward by the different authors. 
 
6. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This dissertation will use qualitative methods to address the objectives set out above. It will 
be based on cases and legislation analysis.40 Other forms of academic work such as 
textbooks, journal articles and newspaper sources will also be considered. More specifically 
the dissertation will investigate academic material that contain an explanation of the 
implementation of affirmative action in the context of its impact in the workplace. In addition 
                                                          
30 E Fergus & D Collier ‘Race and gender at work: The role of the judiciary in promoting workplace 
transformation’ (2014) 30 (3) SAJHR 486. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid at 487. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid at 489. 
35 M Mushariwa ‘Who are the true beneficiaries of affirmative action? – Solidarity obo Barnard v SAPS 2010 5 
BLLR 561 (LC)’ (2011) 32 Obiter 439. 
36 Ibid at 445. 
37 Ibid. 
38 O Dupper ‘Affirmative Action: Who, How and How long?’ (2008) 24 (3) SAJHR 432. 
39 Ibid at 433. 
40 Primary sources are cases and statues, this dissertation will critically assess one specific case in detail. 
Secondary sources are journal articles, textbooks and unpublished/ published dissertations, these sources address 
the law in detail and the author argues on some points. This dissertation will use both these sources. 
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to outlining the legislation, the dissertation will analyse articles that specifically relates to the 
topic.  
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CHAPTER 2 
AN OVERVIEW OF DISCRIMINATION, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE 
BENEFICIARIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Constitution guarantees every citizen a right to equality.41 This means that everyone 
should be treated equally regardless of their race, gender or any of the other listed grounds 
found under section 9 (3). This, however, is not easy to realise. Both the Constitution and the 
EEA prohibit any form of discrimination but, the EEA utilises affirmative action to obtain 
equal opportunities for previously disadvantaged individuals.42 Although the Constitution 
does not specifically allocate the beneficiaries of affirmative action, the identity of these 
individuals is deliberately left vague.43 The EEA provides for affirmative action and the 
beneficiaries thereto.44 This will be dealt with separately under this chapter. The application 
of affirmative action was introduced as an attempt to diversify the workplace and to ensure 
that suitably qualified people from designated groups are offered equal opportunities.45  
 
Historically, designated groups were not adequately represented in many key work 
areas but after South Africa became a democratic country, affirmative action was introduced 
as a mechanism to guarantee that designated groups are equally represented at all levels of 
the workplace.46 Affirmative action falls under the EEA.47 Many cases have been decided by 
the Labour courts, Labour Appeal Courts, Supreme Court of Appeal and Constitutional Court 
that related to discrimination and affirmative action measures that were considered to be 
discriminatory in nature. This chapter will address unfair discrimination, affirmative action 
and the deficiencies of applying affirmative action to achieve transformative change. 
 
 
                                                          
41 Section 9 of the Constitution. 
42 Grogan op cit note 16 at 88. 
43 Mushariwa op cit note 35 at 440. 
44 The definitions section of the EEA defines what is meant by designated employees and who they are. Those 
people listed under this definition are automatically the beneficiaries of affirmative action. Section 12 to 33 of 
the EEA details affirmative action and its operation under the EEA. This includes how it is to be applied and the 
requirements that employers must satisfy when implementing affirmative action measures.  
45 McGregor op cit note 3 at 4. 
46 Ibid at 5. 
47 Chapter 3 of the EEA expressly provides for affirmative action. 
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2.  UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION 
 
One of the core purposes of the EEA is to eradicate any barriers to the advancement of black 
people, women and disabled persons.48 Grogan49 is of the opinion that the EEA complements 
the Labour Relations Act50 (LRA) in two regards. First, it offers a refined version on the 
prohibition on unfair discrimination which is reflected in chapter 2 of the EEA.51 Secondly, a 
duty is imposed on employers to comply with the requisite affirmative action measures. The 
EEA places an obligation on all employers to eliminate any policy that amounts to unfair 
discrimination and to promote equal opportunities for all employees.52 Section 6 of the EEA 
should be read with section 9 of the Constitution as both these sections permit any measures 
that are intended to protect or advance people that were previously disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination.53  
 
Section 6 of the EEA contains a list of the forms of discrimination that are prohibited. 
This list is not exclusive or closed, meaning that if the type of discrimination experienced by 
an employee is closely related to any of the listed grounds, the court will consider it as 
possibly being discriminatory.54 The employee bears the onus of proving that discrimination 
did occur. If they successfully prove discrimination then the onus shifts to the employer to 
prove that they have not acted unfairly.55 The onus that is placed on the employee is not easy 
to discharge as the courts require proof to show that they were subjected to a form of 
discrimination.56 Simply, the employee must show that they experienced selective unfair 
treatment.57 It does not amount to discrimination if an employer applies the prescribed 
affirmative action measures and gives preference to either a black person, woman or a 
disabled person if that candidate is suitably qualified and the company’s policy permits it.58 It 
would be incorrect to categorise affirmative action as a form of unfair discrimination as it is a 
method implemented to place previously disadvantaged people in a better position. The 
                                                          
48 Grogan op cite note 16 at 85. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995.  
51 Chapter 2 of the EEA; s5 and s6 of the EEA. 
52 Section 5 of the EEA. 
53 Fergus & Collier op cit note 30 at 487. 
54 Grogan op cit note 16 at 86. 
55 Ibid at 87. 
56 Fergus & Collier op cit note 30 at 488. 
57 Grogan op cit note 16 at 89. 
58 McGregor op cit note 3 at 6. 
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labour courts have suggested that affirmative action should be conceived as a defence to 
allegations of unfair discrimination.59 
 
3.  AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
 
‘Through legislation and policies, the former government was able to exclude 
blacks and women systematically from having rights in the workplace as well as 
socially, ensuring that their advancement economically and/ or socially was 
curtailed.’60 
 
Chapter 3 of the EEA addresses affirmative action and when it will apply.61 The 
above quotation highlights why it was necessary to address the issues that hovered over the 
groups of people that were discriminated against. The quotation summarises the reason why 
there are certain measures that are put in place to diversify workplaces and empower people 
who experienced restriction on their career choices. Although affirmative action is not 
defined, the EEA is explicit and provides concise measures of the implementation of it. 
Affirmative action is intended to address any social and economic imbalances between 
different groups as well as assist vulnerable groups by offering them better opportunities at 
being employed. Affirmative action requires employers to identify qualified individuals that 
belong to any of the designated groups and offer them equal opportunities.62  
 
Affirmative action does not guarantee an individual employment, just preference in 
order to ensure a diverse workplace.63 The rationale behind affirmative action is to afford all 
individuals equal opportunities at all levels of the workplace.64 These opportunities are 
presumed to have been withheld during apartheid. Thus, all job categories and levels of the 
workplace must have an equal representation of different ethnicities, genders as well as 
disabled people.65  There are critics who are against affirmative action and refer to it as 
reverse discrimination or a form of tokenism.66 Nonetheless, there are people who support the 
aim of affirmative action and see it as an advancement into a new democratic era. The 
                                                          
59 Fergus & Collier op cit note 30 at 486. 
60 Mushariwa op cit note 35 at 439. 
61 Section 12 of the EEA. 
62 McGregor op cit note 3 at 4. 
63 Mushariwa op cit note 35 at 440. 
64 Ibid at 441. 
65 Grogan op cit note 16 at 90. 
66 BB Motileng Affirmative Action: The Experience of People in Middle Management Positions (unpublished 
LLM thesis, University of Pretoria, 2004) 10. 
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transformative laws focus heavily on race and gender.67 Although affirmative action is 
intended to benefit women, black people and persons with disabilities, white women are able 
to benefit from it by virtue of their gender. White women are disadvantaged when compared 
to white men.68 It is well known that non-white people suffered greater disadvantage but this 
forms the main basis of why affirmative action makes it permissible for both genders in 
designated groups to be able to benefit. Success has been minimal in claims of unfair 
discrimination by designated applicants in terms of the EEA.69 Designated employers are 
compelled by chapter 3 of the EEA to implement affirmative action measures for people 
from designated groups who are suitably qualified.70 These employers must work in 
collaboration with their employees when preparing employment equity plans and implement 
them fairly and rationally.  
 
According to the EEA, a person is suitably qualified for a job where they possess 
formal qualifications, prior learning, relevant experience or the capacity to acquire the ability 
to perform the job in a reasonable amount of time.71 In implementing the policy, the 
employer must identify previously disadvantaged individuals for whom the policy is aimed 
at. Section 6(2)(a) of the EEA sets limits to the defence of affirmative action.72 For an 
employer to avoid being branded as unfair, they must ensure that an affirmative appointment 
corresponds with the purposes set out in the EEA.73 Designated groups are to be granted 
benefits but these benefits must be reasonable (should comply with the aim and purpose for 
which employment equity seeks to achieve). Employers cannot grant improvident benefits to 
members that belong in the designated groups or advance their positions without just cause; 
these acts could be considered to go beyond the scope of the goals that are set out in the 
EEA.74  
 
Having ‘broadly representative’75 workforces is the goal that affirmative action seeks 
to achieve, where the attainment of this goal comes at the disadvantage of groups of people 
                                                          
67 Grogan op cit note 16 at 93.  
68 Fergus & Collier op cit note 30 at 489. 
69 Ibid at 496. 
70 Section 20 (3) of the EEA. 
71 Section 15 of the EEA. 
72 Section 6 (2)(a) provides that it is not unfair discrimination to take affirmative action measures consistent 
with the purposes of the Act. Additionally, section 6 (2)(b) also excludes distinguishing, excluding or preferring 
any person on the basis of an inherent requirement of a job as a form of unfair discrimination.  
73 Mushariwa op cit note 35 at 442. 
74 Grogan op cit note 16 at 95. 
75 Ibid at 97. 
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who are considered to be formerly advantaged. This group cannot claim that they were 
unfairly overlooked if the employer has preferred a previously disadvantaged candidate.76 
There has been a surge of cases77 where individuals have challenged the validity of their 
employer’s employment equity plan and the employer had to prove to the court that they 
acted in terms of a defensible plan. Although the aim and purpose of affirmative action and 
the employment equity plans that are set out are understandable, it is evident that they 
prejudice white people to a certain extent. Many consider this a lesser of two evils, meaning 
that it is necessary for the attainment of greater good.78 
 
Before implementing affirmative action measures, employers have to first identify the 
beneficiaries.79 There are two schools of thought concerning the true beneficiaries of 
affirmative action. The first thought provides that the individual only needs to satisfy the 
requirement of being a member of a designated group in order to be classified as previously 
disadvantaged.80 This implies that if an individual belongs to any of the designated groups it 
is prima facie proof that they were previously disadvantaged. McGregor81 lists this as one of 
the deficiencies of the categorisation of affirmative action. The EEA does not have any 
provisions which distinguish the degrees of disadvantage that different people have 
experienced. It presupposes that everyone that is a member of the designated groups has 
experienced the same amount of disadvantage.82 This is problematic because a person who 
has not been disadvantaged can still benefit from affirmative action measures by virtue of 
their designated status. Moreover, the differences between groups are also not acknowledged. 
This strongly suggests that black people, women and disabled people have equally been 
disadvantaged and affected by discrimination.83  
                                                          
76 Ibid. 
77 Independent Municipal & Allied Workers Union v Greater Louis Trichardt Transitional Local Council 
(J644/97) [1999] ZALC 107 found that an employer can rely on affirmative action as a defence only if it has an 
affirmative action policy, if not then they have to justify the appointment of a weak candidate; Public Servants 
Association of South Africa v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & others (J3895/01) [2001] 
ZALC 148 decided that the criteria adopted by the Department of Justice to promote blacks and women instead 
of highly experienced white men was irrational; In Minister of Safety and Security v Coetzer & others 
(JS222/02) [2003] ZALC 11 the court held that where an employer failed to show that they acted in terms of a 
coherent plan then they would be considered to have discriminated against the employees/ applicants that are 
from designated groups; Du Preez v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & others 2006 (9) 
BCLR 1094 (SE). 
78 Fergus & Collier op cit note 30 at 490. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Mushariwa op cit note 35 at 440. 
81 McGregor op cit note 3 at 6. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid at 9. 
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The second school of thought holds that a beneficiary needs to have been personally 
disadvantaged in order to be categorised as someone who can benefit from affirmative 
action.84 This school of thought is problematic and raises many questions as to how one 
would prove that they have been personally. For instance, how much disadvantage should a 
person have experienced in order to satisfy this requirement?85 The question remains open 
and unanswered. Due to this, the first school of thought appears to be the most sufficient way 
to identify the true beneficiaries of affirmative action.86  
 
It is insufficient to merely identify the beneficiaries. The employer must ensure that 
they also meet the criteria of creating an efficient workforce.87 As previously discussed, the 
individual must have the requisite qualifications and skills to be suitably qualified for the job. 
It can be suggested that if an employer considers the perception of different degrees of 
disadvantage within the designated groups, they can easily lose sight of who the true 
beneficiaries of affirmative action are.88  
 
In Dudley v City of Cape Town & another89 the court found that an independent 
individual is not afforded a right to affirmative action as they are not categorised as an 
employee under the LRA and a member of a designated group has no enforceable claim for a 
preferential right. This decision emphasised the point that although candidates from one of 
the designated groups should be afforded preference, they do not have a right to be 
appointed.90 Dudley also serves to show that an individual who is not yet appointed cannot 
rely on the LRA because they are not employees of that company.91 The employer can 
exercise their discretion on whether or not to appoint someone. Mushariwa92 states that there 
are two types of affirmative action policy plans. A strong affirmative action plan disregards 
suitably qualified candidates and gives preference solely to black people and women, whilst a 
weak affirmative action plan ensures that individuals who are not part of the designated 
groups are not overlooked because under ordinary circumstances they would qualify for the 
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87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid at 444. 
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position.93 The Constitution, as well as the courts have argued for the former, despite the fact 
that it may attract strong criticism.94 The distinctions between the types of affirmative action 
plans differ in terms of fairness. Although a weak affirmative action plan is not 
recommended, it seems to support the aim and purpose of employment equity. According to 
various authors,95 affirmative action measures should also consider whether a person has the 
requisite qualifications and skills to fulfil the position.96 Based on the description and aim of 
affirmative action, merely appointing an individual based on the fact that they are in one of 
the designated groups could be interpreted as unfair.97 This act would amount to 
discrimination because the appointed person might not be able to perform the work that they 
are appointed to undertake and it would fall within the ambits of unfair discrimination as 
provided for in the EEA. Additionally, the EEA cannot be used to protect an individual who 
does not act for the purpose that it provides for.98 
 
The principle of substantive equality permits an individual to benefit from affirmative 
action if they fall under a designated group.99 The principle permits this without taking into 
account whether the individual has experienced discrimination on the basis of race or not.100 
In Stoman v Minister of Safety and Security,101 the high court supported the notion that the 
Constitution promotes substantive equality in addition to formal equality. It is uncertain how 
long affirmative action measures will be implemented as discriminatory cases continue to 
plague the country.102 As previously provided, affirmative action was implemented to 
advance previously disadvantaged individuals in their careers and provide better career 
opportunities for them.103 With this advancement, there should be a change in the mentality 
of individuals towards issues of discrimination and equality. In many occupations, there has 
been little or no transformation which alludes to the fact that the EEA has been poorly 
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implemented or poorly drafted.104 The implementation of the EEA will be discussed in detail 
further on in the dissertation. Having put so much emphasis on equality, it is uncertain why 
largely black people occupy the entry-level positions in specific workforces and why other 
black people remain stagnant in their occupation, with little or no progression.105 This is 
evidence that South Africa as a nation has not yet realised its purpose in offering a broadly 
diverse society with no unfair discrimination.  
 
Evidence that has been examined by legal writers suggests that there is a preference 
system in the actual implementation of affirmative action.106 For instance, race is preferred 
over gender and disability, similarly, Africans are preferred over Coloured, Indian and Asian 
people.107 It could be argued that emphasis is placed on race which means that other areas are 
often excluded or redress has not taken place.108 Race is the main focus because apartheid 
systematically excluded individuals based on their race. Based on the previously discussed 
information, using race is considered the best approach to overcome racial discrimination and 
any effects that might have been previously sustained.109 Although using race seems like the 
best approach, sticking a plaster over an open wound does not treat it or ensure that it does 
not leave a scar. An argument was raised against the hastening of transformative laws, this 
was believed to be the reason for the appointment of candidates who were not suitably 
qualified.110  
 
Many questions regarding affirmative action remain unanswered, such as, whether 
there will be a point where it will subsequently be brought to an end. People who are against 
the implementation of affirmative action argue that the EEA should contain a ‘sunset clause’ 
that states that its operation will be abolished on a certain date.111 South Africa’s history has 
left the nation with a scar that cannot easily be cleared by applying laws to try and assist 
those who have been hurt the most to benefit from the new system. Despite affirmative action 
being a temporary measure with a goal, the idea of a time limitation is farcical.112 No 
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individual can dictate how long it will take to rectify discrimination. Employment equity 
legislation contains many implementations but these are heavily flawed, the following 
chapter will look at the implementation of the EEA. Furthermore, chapter 5 of this 
dissertation will provide suggestions on ways to rectify these.  
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
Affirmative action forms a large part of our society and interlinks with discrimination. Were 
it not for the previous discrimination that the country endured, there might not be a need for 
affirmative action measures. Although unfair discrimination still continues, so do affirmative 
action measures. The main purpose of the EEA is enforced through affirmative action. 
Although the measures that are put in place have been referred to as a form of reverse 
discrimination,113 some readings provide that there is a serious need to try and balance the 
inequalities that still exist.114 The system of affirmative action is not perfect and still needs to 
be clarified and addressed. It also seems redundant to impose these on employers without 
providing for a penalty if the employers fail to satisfy the requirements. Affirmative action 
policies adopted by employers need to be closely monitored as most employers use these 
policies as their defence when faced with an allegation of discrimination.115 Although 
transformative laws have made some workplaces more representative and have led to positive 
outcomes, the deficiencies in the system of affirmative action show that there might be a need 
to revisit the legislation and make it more concise.116  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
113 AM Louw ‘The Employment Equity Act, 1998 (and Other Myths about the pursuit of “Equality” and 
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114 Ibid; Mushariwa op cit note 35 at 445. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A recent article that was published in the City Press117 discussed how the government is 
currently seeking to engage with the South African Human Rights Commission (hereinafter 
‘the Body’) regarding the country’s affirmative action and employment equity policies. This 
need for redress comes after the Body found that these policies are unconstitutional.118 This 
means that the standard of which the EEA was drafted or implemented is not in line with 
international conventions.119 Having only been implemented in 1998, the EEA is a fairly new 
piece of legislation. One author goes so far as to argue that the EEA was hastily and poorly 
drafted in order to give immediate remedial action to previously disadvantaged people.120  
 
  This author bluntly points out that legislators can do better than the ‘controversial 
piece of legislation’ referred to as the EEA which is unconstitutional in relation to its 
mandate on affirmative action.121 This chapter will examine sections from the EEA that are 
mostly related to the title of the dissertation as well as the effect that the overall Act has on 
non-designated employees. Furthermore, this chapter will also critically analyse the 
implementation of the EEA and whether it has successfully been implemented in South 
African workplaces. Notwithstanding the critiques of the EEA, this section also aims to 
ascertain whether there are some positive features in its implementation and how those can be 
used to further enhance it and make it more appropriate in terms of South African standards.  
 
2.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR THE EEA 
 
As previously stated, section 9 of the Constitution provides an equality clause.122 This clause 
prohibits any form of discrimination and promotes equal enjoyment of rights. Similarly, the 
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EEA also seeks to protect the right to equality but in addition to that, it is aimed at creating a 
workforce that represents all the demographics of South Africa.123 This means that the 
purpose of the EEA is two-fold. First, it is aimed at eliminating unfair discrimination in the 
workplace.124 Secondly, the EEA implements measures such as affirmative action to redress 
the previous disadvantages as well as to ensure that workforces have equitable representation 
of individuals of the designated groups.125  
 
  The fulfilment of the second purpose requires equitable representation in all the 
occupational levels of the workplace. Some employers comply with both the purposes of the 
EEA but do not go beyond that.126 This means that employers have diverse individuals to 
represent members of the designated groups but these individuals are kept stagnant at a low 
position with no possibility of climbing the hierarchy and occupying higher positions.127 In 
most workplaces in South Africa, members from a designated group can be found in 
administrative or secretarial positions.128 This is a tactic used by employers to put people 
under the misapprehension that they are complying with the EEA when they are merely just 
filling quotas. 
 
3.  THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN TRANSFORMATIVE LAWS 
 
Decisions that have been concluded by the labour courts have indicated that judges are drawn 
towards making a narrow interpretation about equality.129 This means that the courts have a 
conservative approach on the available remedies on discrimination; the courts fail to be more 
mindful of the role that they should play in guaranteeing transformation.130 As previously 
alluded to earlier in the chapter, there have been some problems that are associated with the 
EEA, some of these issues stem from the judicial interpretation of some of the sections of the 
EEA.131 Section 5 of the EEA132 attempts to regulate the behaviour of all employers. 
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Therefore, it has the potential of bringing change in every workplace in the country.133 The 
section compels employers to abolish discriminatory policies and to respond to acts of unfair 
discrimination at work but the interpretation of this section by the judiciary fails to 
accomplish this in two respects. First, it fails to take into account the emphasis placed on 
promoting equal employment opportunities and subsequently the Act’s objective.134  
 
  This easily means that instead of imposing a duty on employers to respond to 
discrimination in the workplace, it imposes a duty for them to forestall it.135 Secondly, 
policies and practices are confined by the construction of section 5 which places programmes 
and systems in place.136 The narrow interpretation of the section has not been extended to 
affirmative action cases in court decisions.137 The impact of section 5 does not satisfy the 
vision of the EEA which is to facilitate substantive and transformative change.138 The courts 
are responsible for ensuring that the interpretation of a specific legislation is consistent with 
both the EEA and Constitution.139 Therefore, if the courts fail to consider an interpretation 
that is in line with both these statutes, then legislative amendments could be necessary as 
changes might be able to clarify the purpose of that particular section.140  
 
4.  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EEA 
 
The EEA lists separate objectives in its preamble141; a relatively new concept is introduced in 
one of the objectives. The concept seeks to ‘achieve a diverse workforce that is broadly 
representative of our people’. This objective was first encountered in the EEA, which shows 
that the whole aim of the EEA is to ensure diversity and representation142 in workplaces.  
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  Section 6 (1) of the EEA prohibits unfair discrimination in any employment policy or 
practice and applies to all employers.143 The section also provides specific grounds that 
would constitute unfair reasons on which to base a decision. Section 6 (2) provides instances 
that do not fall under the realm of unfair discrimination.144 This section is pivotal as it states 
that an employer may be able to defend a claim of unfair discrimination. However, the best 
approach to combat discrimination and ensure that employers take employment equity laws 
seriously is for the labour courts to change their view on affirmative action being a defence to 
allegations of unfair discrimination but rather view it as an essential part to achieving 
equality.145 
  The change in the perception of the labour court will prompt employers to comply 
with the laws and perhaps significantly decrease the amount of employers who use 
employment equity mechanisms as quota systems and rather use these systems to empower 
previously disadvantaged people to get better positions in the workplace.146 Both Fergus and 
Collier suggest that there is a divide between the prohibition of unfair discrimination found in 
chapter 2 and the employer’s duties to establish and implement employment equity plans in 
their workplaces found in chapter 3.147 The effect of this is that employees are barred from 
basing their claim for unfair discrimination on their employer’s failure to implement a proper 
affirmative action policy.148 
  In Minister of Safety and Security v Govender149 the employee instituted proceedings 
for unfair discrimination against their employer because they had applied for a promotion on 
three separate occasions without any success. The employee alleged that the unfair 
discrimination was a result of poor implementation of the employer’s employment equity 
plan.150 The employee further alleged that had it not been for the employer’s non-compliance 
of equity plan, he would have been appointed to the relevant post.151 Although, the labour 
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court could not exercise jurisdiction over the matter, the employer was found to have unfairly 
discriminated against the employee but a breach of section 6 had not occurred.152 This case 
illustrates the existence of the divide between chapter 2 and chapter 3 that is suggested by the 
two authors because Govender had contended that the employer had failed to adequately 
apply the employment equity plan which ultimately amounted to unfair discrimination.153 
 
  Chapter 3 of the EEA reemphasises the issue of racial and gender representivity 
which is closely related to its mandate. Additionally, the chapter compels employers to 
follow certain processes when dealing with affirmative action disputes.154 These measures are 
put in place for suitably qualified people from designated groups. Where the employer fails to 
comply with chapter 3, the non-compliance may be brought to the attention of either the 
labour inspector, director-general of the Department of Labour or the CCMA.155 There are 
several steps that any of these bodies can institute against an employer for non-compliance.156 
Interference by the courts is limited under matters that fall under chapter 3. Section 13 
explicitly provides that designated employers must undertake affirmative action measures 
that are set out in section 15 (1).157 Additionally, the employer must not take decisions 
relating to the measures unilaterally, they must consult with their employees.158 Section 15 
(2)(d) (i) further provides that affirmative action measures must make sure that an equitable 
representation of suitably qualified people from designated groups must be reflected at all 
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levels of the workplace.159 This coincides with an argument raised earlier in the chapter 
regarding the lack of transformation at managerial positions in most workplaces.160 Section 
19 requires an analysis of the profile of a designated employer’s workforce in order to 
‘determine the degree of underrepresentation of people from designated groups in the 
employer’s workforce’.161 This means that information must be collected and an analysis 
must be conducted in order to ensure that an effective employment equity plan has been 
drafted to adequately provide for designated employees or prospective employees. The 
information that is collected and analysed assists in identifying employment barriers that exist 
and impact on people from the designated groups.162  
 
  Section 20 discusses the preparation of the employment equity plan. This section 
adequately sets out the main features that a plan must have. The employment equity plan 
should be reflective of the affirmative action legislation contained in the EEA.163 This plan 
should have the current policies implemented in the workforce, any barriers and the remedial 
steps that will be implemented to eradicate the existing barriers. The purpose of the plan is to 
take practical steps in achieving reasonable progress towards employment equity in the 
workplace.164 Although the plan must outline the steps that the employer will take in attaining 
equality in the workplace, it should comply with the set guidelines that are allocated in 
section 20 (1) and 20 (2).165  
 
  Chapter 5 sets out the enforcement of the EEA.166 The labour inspectors are appointed 
by the labour court to enforce the EEA through undertakings to comply and compliance 
orders.167 Section 42 serves as a very important provision that is used when inspecting 
whether employment equity is being implemented in accordance with the EEA.168 The 
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section addresses the concept of demographics as well as representivity.169 Prior to the 
amendment of section 42 in 2013, the section contained a number of indicators that were used 
to assess the employer’s compliance with the EEA.170 This is the only section in the EEA 
which makes an attempt at defining ‘equitable representation’ which is considered to be 
central to the purpose of the Act.171 The determination of the underrepresentation of a group 
is a fundamental part of affirmative action as it helps in achieving a certain amount of 
appointments of suitably qualified people from designated groups. Both private and public 
institutions have been compelled to address transformation issues in the workplace because of 
the enactment of the EEA.172  
 
  No workforce should take employment equity legislation lightly. Most of the sections 
that have been previously discussed in this chapter, seek to ensure that the EEA is being 
consistently, adequately and correctly applied in order to effectively guarantee 
transformation. Although the EEA attempts to address all the guidelines and steps to be 
followed in the implementation of it, it also fails to impose serious sanctions for non-
compliance of it.173 If the guidelines provided in the EEA are properly followed and complied 
with, it is suggested that it will move South African employers a step closer to achieving the 
goal of equality in the workplace. This arguably forms an important part in overcoming the 
effect of apartheid and building a better society.174  
 
  Many authors have argued that the proper implementation of the EEA could 
ultimately assist South African workplaces to extinguish discrimination and promote 
equitable employment policies and practices.175 Many authors have also expressed their 
concerns in the implementation of the EEA. They have argued that it fails to satisfy its 
purpose and ensure employment equity through the measures that it has outlined.176 These 
authors argue that rather than addressing important issues and ensuring that employers 
comply with the measures, the EEA makes employers fearful and prompts them to act merely 
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to satisfy an allocated quota.177 The EEA assists in identifying the beneficiaries of affirmative 
action and guidelines to ensuring equity in the workplace. However, the EEA does not outline 
any steps that should be taken to prompt employers to promote said beneficiaries to higher 
positions.178  
 
  Section 60 of the EEA imposes vicarious liability on employers for any contravention 
of the EEA committed by their employees.179 The provision states that where a contravention 
has been committed and has been brought to the attention of the employer, that employer 
must ensure that they consult all the relevant parties and take the necessary steps to eliminate 
the conduct that has been alleged.180 If the employer is aware of the contravention but fails to 
take the required steps, they are regarded as having committed a discriminatory act 
personally.181 However, the employer is able to escape liability if they are able to show that 
they did all that was ‘reasonably practicable’ to ensure that the employee in question would 
not act contrary to the EEA.182 The rationale behind this, is to help any employees who 
experience discrimination from their colleagues to have an available recourse.183 This also 
ensures that the employer will adequately respond appropriately to allegations of 
discrimination and encourage them to address grievances that are related to discrimination 
and have been raised by employees.184With regards to section 60, the courts have remarked 
that the section merely imposes obligations on employers for the protection of their staff in a 
minimal manner.185 
 
 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
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The implementation of the EEA is essentially aimed at not only promoting equality and 
diversification in the workplace but also the general reception towards discrimination in the 
workplace.186 It gives guidelines that employers must follow when either selecting a 
prospective employee, promoting an employee or dealing with a current employee. The 
implementation of the EEA is not without its flaws. It mentions many guidelines but minimal 
sanctions for contravening them.187 This could be one of the main reasons why employers are 
not consistent in their application of it. The EEA mentions underrepresentation but does not 
deal with the issue of overrepresentation.188 This raises a question on the establishment and 
development of the Barnard principle which was applied in the Barnard case and will be 
discussed in detail in chapter 4.  
 
  The EEA does not directly or indirectly address whether an employee can be refused 
employment on the bases of overrepresentation of their race group in a workplace.189 This 
could indicate possible conflict between the EEA and a decision made by the court. The 
former deals with the promotion of individuals from the designated group and diversification 
in the workplace while the latter makes an exemption and hinders an individual’s prospects of 
employment but also deals with diversification. The implementation of the EEA has not been 
as efficient as legislators had planned and this has led to instances of non-compliance.190 As 
previously alluded to in the beginning of the chapter, the EEA has been found to be 
unconstitutional by the Body and may need to be revisited in due course.191 
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CHAPTER 4 
REFUSAL OF APPOINTMENT DUE TO OVERREPRESENTATION OF A SPECIFIC 
RACE GROUP 
 
1.  SOLIDARITY OBO BARNARD 
(a)  Facts   
 
Barnard was a white female who was employed as a constable for the South African Police 
Service (‘SAPS’) from 1989.192 She served many years in service. In 1997 she was promoted 
to become a captain and was later transferred to another branch.193 She remained loyal and 
dedicated to all of her assigned positions within SAPS. In 2005, a new position was created 
and was stated to be a non-designated post.194 Barnard was interviewed by a panel for the 
position and was the highest scoring candidate.195 Despite this, SAPS had adopted an 
employment equity plan that set targets for the positions that were available.196 The 
employment equity plan was intended to reflect the racial demographics of the population. 
After the adoption of the employment equity plan, the recommendations made stated that 
appointing a white individual would not add to the ratio of black officers at that level.197  
 
  The post was withdrawn. The post was re-advertised the following year and Barnard 
obtained the highest score again.198 She was recommended by the interview panel to be 
appointed.199 Despite Barnard’s highest rank out of all the candidates present at the interview, 
the National Commissioner made the final decision not to appoint her.200 Again, the 
Commissioner deliberated that it would not address representivity.201 The post remained 
vacant.202 Barnard approached the Commissioner for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
(‘CCMA’) where she filed a grievance.203 Thereafter, the dispute was referred to four courts, 
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where four different judgments were decided but ultimately a judgment was handed down by 
the Constitutional Court.  
 
(b) Labour court    
 
The court had to decide whether SAPS had unfairly discriminated against Barnard by 
denying her a promotion on two occasions because she is white.204 Acting Judge (AJ) 
Pretorius set out a series of unopposed propositions. First, the EEA and SAPS equity plan 
was required to give regard to affected employees’ right to dignity and equality, thus, the two 
were meant to be applied fairly.205 In order to assess whether SAPS had complied with the 
propositions, the court outlined the relevant sections in the EEA which contained the essence 
of the purpose of it and prohibition against unfair discrimination.206 Secondly, the court stated 
that the law limits the extent to which equity plans may discriminate against employees.207 
This means that the employer bears the onus of proving that the alleged discrimination is fair 
in terms of the EEA.208 Thirdly, provisions from the EEA are required to be applied fairly and 
rationally whilst taking all the employees’ rights into consideration.209 It is insufficient for the 
employer to merely apply a numerical goal to achieve representivity.210 Furthermore, a 
person from another group should not be denied appointment or promotion without a valid 
reason where a candidate from an under-represented group cannot be found to fill the vacant 
position.211  
 
  Barnard understood the repercussions of affirmative action and how they could 
adversely affect people.212 SAPS raised the defence that Barnard could not claim that she had 
been discriminated against because the post had remained vacant and no appointments had 
been made.213 Pretorius AJ held that the failure to appoint Barnard was based on her race and 
amounted to discrimination, the non-appointment of other candidates did not alter the fact 
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that it was unfair and did not comply with the EEA.214 The failure to leave the position vacant 
when there was a suitably qualified black candidate available was an unfair and irrational 
way to implement an equity plan.215 SAPS equity plan had provided that when filling in 
posts, service delivery must be taken into account. In concluding its judgment, the court 
clearly emphasised that they failed to understand how failure to fill a post could rationally be 
justified by the need for an efficient police force.216 The labour court decided the matter by 
ascertaining what is required in an employment equity plan and what representivity entails.217 
This decision seemingly confirmed that affirmative action measures may be subjected to 
judicial scrutiny.218 Additionally, when an employer’s equity plan is challenged, that 
employer must, at most prove that the equity goals that they are pursuing are reasonable, 
rational and fair.219 SAPS appealed on the basis that they believe that Pretorius AJ had 
misread their equity plan, the EEA and the Constitution.  
 
(c) Labour appeal court  
 
The labour appeal court (LAC) noted that the labour court judgment concluded that where a 
post cannot be filled by a suitable candidate from an underrepresented category then a 
candidate from another group should not be denied the opportunity if they are suitable for the 
position.220 The LAC differed in their approach to the case. The court first found that the case 
dealt with the implementation of an equity plan where it is unfavourable to persons from non-
designated groups.221 More specifically, the LAC had to ascertain whether the SAPS equity 
plan should be suppressed in instances that its implementation would negatively affect people 
from non-designated groups.222 The labour court had failed to narrow the scope of what the 
case dealt with. The LAC observed the normal interpretation of discrimination and 
unanimously found that the present case did not contain any discrimination or 
differentiation.223 According to the court, Barnard had neither been discriminated against nor 
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differentiated against in the consideration of her application.224 Grogan is of the opinion that 
if there had been an affirmative action appointment then the manner in which Barnard 
approached the court would have significantly differed.225 In such an instance, Barnard would 
have had to prove that the appointed candidate was not suitably qualified and therefore their 
appointment would have been irrational. 226 
 
  The judges in the LAC found that the issue was the relationship between section 9 (1) 
and 9 (2) of the Constitution.227 This entailed considering whether the EEA and SAPS equity 
plan were applied respectively in accordance with the principles of fairness and bearing in 
mind the constitutional right to equality afforded to the affected individual.228 According to 
the LAC, the labour court erred in placing more emphasis on the individual’s rights to 
equality and dignity above equity measures of rationality and fairness.229 One of the other 
conclusions that was reached by the LAC was that the failure to appoint a black candidate 
could not necessarily be regarded as a failure to implement an equity plan.230 Due to the fact 
that Barnard’s promotion would not have yielded any changes in representivity at that level 
of employment, her appointment would have stifled the SAPS equity provisions in which 
black candidates had a claim to be preferred. 231 The LAC effectively held that if Barnard had 
been discriminated against, the discrimination was not unfair because the equity plan was 
rational.232  
 
  Although the equity plan itself was not thoroughly observed, the court found that 
where an equity plan was rational in achieving an attainable goal then no discrimination can 
be said to have taken place, if it had, it would be fair.233 The equity plan served as a method 
of removing the inequality that existed in the past.234 The consequence thereof is that the 
implementation of affirmative action measures operate to the detriment of non-designated 
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groups.235 Grogan states that after the decisions in both the labour court and LAC, a question 
arose on whether the Barnard decision raised an absolute barrier to claims of unfair 
discrimination by overrepresented race groups in a particular workforce where the employer 
presents its equity plan as a defence.236  
 
  Grogan discusses the judgment in detail.237 He does this by making reference to two 
judgments, namely, Naidoo v Minister of Safety and Security238 and Munsamy v Minister of 
Safety and Security & another.239 The facts of both cases do not differ significantly to that of 
Barnard. The only differences were that firstly, Naidoo and Munsamy were both Indians, one 
female and the other a male respectively, whereas Barnard was a white female.240 Secondly, 
the posts in both cases were not left vacant but rather filled.241 Thirdly, the applicants in both 
cases contended that the equity plans were not in accordance with the EEA.242  
 
  In Munsamy, the court noted a document that detailed the numerical goals in 
KwaZulu-Natal demographics that had been compiled by the employer.243 The document 
detailed the different race groups that would need to be allocated to certain posts to meet 
equity goals. In the end, the court in Munsamy noted that employers may utilise 
discriminatory measures in order to make their workforces equally representative.244 The 
court relied on the LAC decision of Barnard as confirmation and also added that an employer 
cannot prefer one group of designated employees over another who are already 
overrepresented without proof of a valid equity plan which permits it.245 The employer in 
Naidoo denied that their appointment of a black candidate was made solely on the basis of 
achieving numeric targets which were set out in their equity plan.246 The court found that 
plenty of focus had been placed on African candidates and the focus needed to shift to other 
members within the designated group.247 The court further held that the equity plan created 
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an employment barrier against indian people which was prohibited in terms of the EEA.248 It 
was held that Indians were overrepresented but the equity plan did not consider or make 
provision for the employment of Indian females, this amounted to unfair discrimination.249 
The Munsamy case serves to show the influence that the labour court and LAC decision in 
Barnard has had on subsequent cases. 
 
  Whilst the Naidoo case serves to show the general consideration that courts have 
towards females being appointed despite an overrepresentation of their race group, this 
approach was unfortunately not followed in the Barnard case. Ultimately, Barnard had not 
challenged the SAPS equity plan which required the appointment of a black candidate to the 
relevant post.250 Barnard had contended that she had been unfairly discriminated against 
because she was white. She argued that this using section 6 (1) of the EEA.251 She wanted the 
court to order SAPS to promote her to the relevant post because she had achieved the highest 
score and had been recommended by the interview panel as the preferred candidate.252 The 
court held that due to an overrepresentation of her race group, Barnard was aware that black 
candidates were targeted for the post. The matter proceeded to the Supreme Court of Appeal 
(SCA). 
 
(d) Supreme court of appeal    
 
The SCA noted the purpose of the implementation of the EEA.253 The EEA was enacted in 
order to assist the country in overcoming historical injustices by placing measures to facilitate 
equal opportunities being granted to all.254 The SCA found Barnard’s experience to be a 
pivotal point.255 The advertisements that contained information of the posts that Barnard 
applied for had not been reserved for candidates of designated groups. Judge Navsa rejected 
the suggestion from the LAC that Barnard had not been discriminated against by the actions 
of the employer to leave the post vacant.256 This suggestion by the LAC incorrectly presumes 
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that an individual is only discriminated against where another person is advantaged by the 
Act.257  
  The SCA could find no reason why the LAC had treated Barnard as if she was not a 
designated employee when she was a designated employee by virtue of being a female.258 
Although the EEA permits numerical goals,259 it does not deliberate on the distribution of the 
weight of the four designated groups in equity plans.260 The SCA held that the EEA prohibits 
an absolute barrier approach that is created where an employer fails to find a suitable black 
candidate to fill a post and overlooks a suitable available white candidate.261 The LAC 
decision had affirmed that employers are entitled to set targets and overlook members of 
overrepresented groups in all appointments until the targets are met.262 So the concept of non-
appointment of overrepresented groups was not a new concept when the CC judgment was 
written. For the purpose of this dissertation, the SCA decision does not deliberate further on 
the subject-matters related to the theme of the paper. 
 
(e) Constitutional court  
 
Justice Moseneke first noted the values enshrined in the Constitution including human dignity 
and the achievement of equality.263 The guarantee of equality is that everyone will be 
afforded equal protection and benefit of the law. The Constitution also considers the history 
of the country and seeks transformative change by allowing for active steps to be made to 
achieve substantive equality.264 These steps should not infringe on the dignity of other 
individuals. Although remedial measures are implemented to advance people who were 
previously disadvantaged, they must not unduly infringe on the rights of the people who are 
affected by them.265 Justice Moseneke re-emphasised a point that was previously discussed in 
this dissertation which is that, restitution measures alone are inadequate to advance social 
equity.266 
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After discussing discrimination and its effects on society, Justice Moseneke looked at the 
EEA and considered the aims and purpose of it. In Minister of Finance & another v Van 
Heerden267 the court established how restitution measures are able to be constitutional, this 
included the fact that the measure must target a particular class of people who have 
previously experienced unfair discrimination.268  
 
  Furthermore, the restitution measure must be designed with the purpose of either 
protecting or advancing that particular group of people and the promotion of equality within 
the workforce.269 Once the measure passes the test, it is not considered or presumed to be 
unfair.270 The court still reserves the right to intervene and investigate whether the measure 
falls within the scope of section 9 (2) of the EEA. The majority noted an important point 
which was that the EEA permits for affirmative action to include preferential treatment and 
numerical goals but to exclude quotas.271 Justice Moseneke failed to understand why the EEA 
did not define what quotas are.272 Although the definition of quotas was not required for the 
present case, the legislature should have given a clear and concise definition for it. Not 
having a clear definition provides judges with too much discretion and the power to ‘make 
the law’ which is not the role of the judiciary.273  
 
  The SAPS restitutionary measures were based on targets that took into account 
national demographics and provided numerical targets for different levels.274 This suggests 
that it is important for a company to ascertain the demographics of that particular area and set 
numerical targets based on that.275 In considering the numerical targets, companies should 
also bear in mind the demographic of the area. Where an area consists of a large amounts of a 
particular race group, it is futile to set targets to advance other races and disregard the race 
that forms a large part of the area because that specific demographic will be prejudiced by 
that particular restitution measure.276 The majority found that the SCA’s judgment had been 
concluded based on the premise that the equality claim was unfair discrimination on the 
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ground of race.277 In the SCA reaching their decision, they were obliged to approach the 
claim through section 9 (2) of the Constitution and section 6 (2) of the EEA.278 The majority 
of the CC considered the test in Harksen v Lane NO & others279 and concluded that it was 
incorrect to use this test as the SAPS equity plan’s application was never challenged.280  
 
  Another issue that the CC majority raised in their judgment was how Barnard’s claim 
had changed from being directed at unfair discrimination.281 It was aimed at the national 
commissioner’s decision not to appoint her and this ultimately amounted to a review of his 
decision.282 Based on this point only being raised at the final stage of appeal, it could not be 
raised.283 When the court considered the issue of service delivery, they found that service 
delivery was not adversely affected by the failure of SAPS to appoint Barnard.284 This 
finding was contrary to the finding of the SCA.285 Furthermore, the national commissioner 
could not be found at fault for the general fact that white women were overrepresented at that 
level.286 The decision of the national commissioner had not set a barrier to her 
advancement.287 
 
  Although the Barnard case deliberated on many points and had a majority and 
minority judgment, for the purposes of this dissertation it is crucial to only consider a few 
points that were raised in the majority judgment. In the majority judgment written by Justice 
Moseneke, the national commissioner was permitted to exercise his discretion and with that 
he decided not to appoint Barnard because of representivity.288 His exercise of discretion was 
not found to be unlawful.289 In Justice Jafta’s judgment, he refers to the LAC’s judgment as a 
crucial point regarding representivity on the level that Barnard was applying for.290  
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  Ultimately Barnard was denied relief because white officers were ‘overrepresented’ at 
the level she had applied for.291 The Barnard principle which denotes that an employer may 
refuse to appoint a candidate who is a race group that is already adequately represented in 
that workforce was read into the case as it was not expressly stated in it.292 This ruling was 
initially introduced by the CC and imposed on Barnard who was a white female. This 
principle favoured overlooking Barnard for the position based on an adequate representation 
of her race at that workplace. This meant that her non-appointment was accepted by the court 
and did not amount to unfair discrimination.293  
 
  Two years after Barnard came the CC judgment of Solidarity & others v Department 
of Correctional Services & others (Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union & another as amici 
curiae)294. One of the issues that the majority judgment addressed was whether the Barnard 
principle could be raised by the defendants against black people who seek positions and 
promotions if those positions are already overrepresented by that race group.295 The case 
decided whether this principle could be applied to employees that are part of the designated 
groups? Justice Zondo summarised his findings in the following passage: 
 
‘…the application of the Barnard principle is not limited to White candidates. Black 
candidates, whether they are African people, Coloured people or Indian people are also subject 
to the Barnard principle. Indeed, both men and women are also subject to that principle. This 
has to be so because the transformation of the workplace entails, in my view, that the 
workforce of an employer should be broadly representative of the people of South Africa. A 
workplace or workforce that is broadly representative of the people of South Africa cannot be 
achieved with an exclusively segmented workforce.’296 
 
  This judgment essentially ruled that no person is immune to the application of the 
Barnard principle. The court went so far as to give an example that stated that a workforce 
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that consisted of only whites and Indians could not be broadly representative any more than 
that with only Africans and Indians.297 The meaning of equitable representation means that all 
race groups must be spread proportionally regardless of whether they are within or outside 
the designated groups.298 Justice Zondo also made an example which illustrated that broad 
representation also refers to an equitable representation of all race groups in different 
management positions.299 The court failed to deliberate on the rationality of the demographic 
figures considered in the case and whether these were based on national or regional 
statistics.300 Section 15 (3) explicitly prohibits the use of quotas and the Barnard principle 
has been described by Grogan as amounting to a quota because it limits a candidate from 
being appointed due to the fact that the workforce already has an adequate amount of people 
representing that race group.301  
 
  The Barnard principle is not authorised under the EEA and therefore there is no 
justification behind it other than the hindrance of the appointments of different race groups.302 
Another problem with the principle is that it fails to consider the demographics of a particular 
area.303 In an area with a high population of Indian people, it is highly probable that the 
workforce will have a wider representation of them at most of the levels of the workplace.304 
Thus, the Department of Correctional Services case concluding that the Barnard principle 
includes black people as well as both males and females.305 Although the application of the 
principle on all individuals that belong to the designated groups306 defeats the purpose of 
which the EEA seeks to accomplish, its main aim is to attain representativity of all race 
groups in workplaces.307 In Department of Correctional Services, the applicants were 
Coloured people in the Western Cape, a place that has a high demographic of Coloured 
people. Rather than considering only national demographics, the regional statistics should be 
taken into account to ensure that the individuals are given fair opportunities of being 
appointed. 
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  The courts have not commented on the legality of not appointing someone because 
their group is adequately represented.308 There also seems to be no correlation between that 
and the EEA.309 It is difficult to comprehend how both the Barnard principle and the EEA 
can co-exist and operate simultaneously and both yield their intended outcomes. Although 
both have the aim to diversify workplaces and have broadly representative workforces, one 
can possibly limit the other to achieve its goal. The EEA permits for designated groups to be 
preferred in certain relevant instances and the Barnard principle effectively permits 
employers to refuse appointing a person, whether from a designated group or not, due to 
overrepresentation.310 Courts are yet to address the issue of how workforces are expected to 
have an equal representation of all the race groups in South Africa.311 Although ‘broadly 
representative’ sounds appealing and fair, expecting workplaces to set targets for how many 
race groups they are to employ in a year seems drastic and too burdensome.312 The CC must 
also address why quotas are not permitted and furthermore explain the difference between 
that and having numerical targets of race groups to employ.  
 
2.  CONCLUSION 
 
There is no plausible explanation on why the courts would formulate a principle that would 
contradict with existing legislation. The difference in how the courts assessed, deliberated 
and decided the Barnard case is evident in their judgments. The SCA decision was 
favourable to Barnard, while the LAC and CC could not conclusively find that there was 
unfair discrimination present in the refusal to appoint her. This case clearly illustrates how 
the courts will view unfair discrimination cases and that the individual who bears the onus of 
proving it should be persuasive in their argument. The Department of Correctional Services 
case served to illustrate how the courts have responded to affirmative action cases after 
Barnard.313 The case not only followed the Barnard principle but also extended its narrow 
application to include other races and genders.  
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  Although the judgment explained that this was to realise the goal of broadly 
representative workforces, it did not explain how the principle will operate whilst the EEA 
attempts to rectify the past discriminations faced by individuals from the designated 
groups.314 This still remains open and undiscussed. Although it seems unfair to argue that the 
principle’s application is more complicated on a person from a designated group by virtue of 
their race, some could argue that it represents equal treatment. Conversely, if the principle 
was held to not apply to individuals from the designated groups then it would have opened 
the floodgates at courts for claims of unfair discrimination. People that do not belong in the 
designated groups would have felt prejudiced twice, first for affirmative action measures and 
secondly for being denied employment where their race group is said to be adequately 
represented. 
  
  Consequently, if a black individual approaches a court for a matter of being refused 
employment because their race group is already overrepresented, will the courts look at their 
right to be considered for the job, restitutionary measures offered by the EEA, assess the 
equity plan of that workplace or will it simply rule in favour of the Barnard principle? These 
questions will most likely be answered if another similar case comes before the CC.  
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CHAPTER 5 
SUGGESTIONS/ RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
This final chapter is aimed at putting forward suggestions to the possible conflict between the 
EEA and Barnard principle. The courts have not addressed the issue and therefore it is 
difficult to comment on the legality of the Barnard principle at this stage. This chapter will 
also consider any problems that might have previously been discussed in the preceding 
chapter relating to the EEA or affirmative action measures. The existing problems with the 
EEA are prominent and are a cause for concern due to the finding that it is not in line with the 
Constitution. Although the EEA has its problems, it is futile to suggest that it be completely 
cancelled because its purpose is important in addressing issues that were faced by many 
people in the country. Finally, this chapter will conclude the dissertation and summarise the 
findings of the overall research. 
 
2.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
As previously discussed in chapter 2, ascertaining the true beneficiaries of affirmative action 
has been contended since the implementation of the EEA.315 McGregor insists that many 
people benefit by virtue of their race being part of a designated group whilst they did not 
experience any discrimination.316 Furthermore, she states that employers should consider the 
level of disadvantage a person has experienced.317 The system that McGregor suggests could 
assist in revealing the true beneficiaries but it will be too burdensome on the employer as it is 
near impossible to establish the level of disadvantage a person has experienced unless a 
criterion is provided.318 Mushariwa suggests that the implementation of affirmative action 
should not have a general application.319 This means that it would be strictly applied on a 
case-by-case basis in terms of considering the equity plan of that workforce and the 
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demographics of the people that work there.320 In addition to considering the above 
mentioned, other factors such as social, gender and educational disadvantage should be 
regarded when ascertaining the true beneficiaries of affirmative action. An employer in 
reaching their decision of appointing an individual from a designated group, must ensure that 
the candidate is suitably qualified.321  
 
  It is possible to realise Mushariwa’s suggestion. The EEA should contain a further 
provision in the measure of affirmative action which will oblige the employer to consider the 
social, educational and economic disadvantage experienced by an individual. Although the 
suggestions put forward by McGregor and Mushariwa are similar, Mushariwa provided 
aspects that the criterion must ascertain whereas McGregor did not. 
 
           A development of section 5 of the EEA is required.322 This must take place in a 
manner that engages the employer and prompts them to promote transformation in the 
workplace. This means that the relationship between chapter 2 and 3 of the EEA should be 
reconsidered and structured in a way that will facilitate transformation in all workplaces.323 
Additionally, because judges can utilise their discretion, they should be mindful of the 
hardships entailed in the proving of discrimination. The court should recall the broad powers 
afforded to it by both the EEA and LRA.324 Therefore, discrimination should be interpreted to 
include implicit forms which could affect the employee as well as their performance at 
work.325 The EEA should contain a provision which obliges employers to provide skills 
development to designated employees at the lowest level in the workplace.326 This will allow 
them to improve their skills and get promoted within that workplace.  
 
             Some key issues were identified in the Commission for Employment Equity Annual 
Report.327 To these, the commission responded by offering amendment proposals which 
include revisiting the definition of designated employers, and setting of sector targets as an 
                                                          
320 Mushariwa op cit note 35 at 449. 
321 Ibid at 450. 
322 Deane op cit note 157 at 382. 
323 Fergus & Collier op cit note 30 at 500. 
324 Mushariwa op cit note 35 at 450. 
325 Ibid. 
326 Booysen op cit note 127 at 59. 
327 T Kabinde Commission for Employment Equity: Annual Report (2018) 1.  
47 
 
enabling provision to monitor and measure the compliance.328 The proposed amendments to 
the EEA are aimed at easy regulation. In identifying key issues, the report also concluded that 
there had been a lack of equitable representation at top management level which has a 
negative impact on the economic growth of the country.329 The solution suggested in the 
report to this problem is to implement strategies or to develop the existing ones. The report 
also considers the fact that the EEA and Skills Development Act330 were aimed at supporting 
each other in order to drive transformation and achieve an outcome of developing the skills of 
people from designated groups but failed to achieve the desired outcome.331 Drastic steps 
must be taken to offer more opportunities to designated employees by either developing, 
recruiting and promoting them at a professionally qualified level.332  
 
          The government sector appears to have achieved more transformation than the private 
sector in terms of representation of designated groups.333 This could indicate that their equity 
plans have successfully been implemented or that employers in the private sector need to take 
employment equity laws more seriously.334 Louw feels very strongly about the EEA having a 
sunset clause335 but the EEA has not yet achieved effective transformation in workplaces. 
Therefore, the idea of a sunset clause is premature and should be withheld as it will take a 
long time to achieve the aims and objectives set out in the EEA. 
 
          As briefly alluded to in the previous chapter, it is insufficient for the national 
demographics to be regarded instead of regional demographics as this is a true reflection of 
the prospective employees.336 Similarly, in the Department of Correctional Services case, the 
court applied the principle without giving regard to the fact that the Coloured employees form 
a large population in the Western Cape chose not to appoint them because their race groups 
was adequately represented at the workforce.337 The next time the CC considers a matter 
where the Barnard principle is raised, the court must address the matter. The court cannot, in 
                                                          
328 Ibid at 5. 
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its effort to achieve a certain goal disregard the provisions of the EEA which are also set out 
to achieve its purpose.338  
 
3.  CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the research set out, the legality of the Barnard principle has yet to be confirmed. 
Despite this, the research strongly suggests that there is no place for the principle in the 
country’s legislation which seeks to address the issues that were previously experienced. The 
EEA is aimed at empowering, promoting and offering better opportunities to designated 
groups. Anything that interferes with the attainment of its goals and/ or objectives should be 
disregarded and considered unlawful as it would be directly affecting the operation the EEA. 
That being said, it should be noted that the EEA is not without its flaws, these must be 
addressed so that it will be in line with the Constitution. 
 
         The correction of the EEA should be done in such a way that it directly stipulates what 
should be done by employers and what consequences will stem from non-compliance. 
Granting judge’s discretion on the punishment that employers should achieve ensures that the 
provisions set out in the EEA are dynamic instead of rigid. It is insufficient to expect 
employers to comply with all the prescribed provisions of employment equity, this must be 
strictly regulated.339 Most employers utilise a quota system despite the EEA expressly 
prohibiting this.340 This is only a few of the things that employers do that show that they 
blatantly disregard the provisions set out along with not promoting designated employees to 
top positions.  
 
 In order for employers to strictly comply with the EEA, they should be expected to 
submit an annual report on their employees and whether they have complied with their equity 
plan.341 Skills development programs should be made compulsory by employer to assist in 
advancing their employees in their career.342 Failure to apply the prescribed requirements 
should result in either monetary penalty or imprisonment of that employer. This is the only 
way that employers will correctly and adequately enforce the provisions set out in the 
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EEA.343 In everything the employer does, they must bear in mind the constitutional rights 
afforded to the employee. 
                                                          
343 Mushariwa op cit note 35 at 450. 
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